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It was an unceremonious conclusion. After four years of bitterly
contested litigation, extensive legal and popular press,' interplay between
federal and state courts, and multiple judicial opinions, the class action
lawsuit Nicholson v. Scoppetta2 ended with a brief settlement order. On
December 17, 2004, the court entered a four-page Stipulation & Order of
Settlement. In it, the parties agreed that the New York Court of Appeals'
decision accurately reflected the applicable law to be followed by New
York City's child welfare agency, the Administration for Children's Ser-
vices ("ACS").3 This settlement averted further litigation to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
4
The Nicholson case, taken in its entirety, creates significant law for
battered women and their children, notwithstanding its short settlement
t Associate Professor, Southern New England School of Law. Thanks to Lisa Carlson and
Cathy O'Neill for their research assistance. Thanks, too, to Philip Cleary and Irene Scharf for their
counsel. Finally, I appreciate the writing support provided by Southern New England School of
Law.
1. Print, television, and legal media all covered the case. For instance, Dateline NBC fea-
tured a segment on Nicholson. NBC News: Dateline (NBC television broadcast, July 31, 2001).
New York papers, including the New York Times, New York Post, and the New York Daily News
also carried articles. Somini Sengupta, Tough Justice: Taking a Child Wen One Parent is Battered,
NY TIMES, July 8, 2000, at Al; Kati Cornell Smith, Court Boosts Custody for Abused Moms, NEW
YORK POST, Mar. 5, 2002, at 19; Mike Claffey, Testimony by Mother Rips ACS, NEW YORK DAILY
NEWS, July 17, 2001, at 24. The popular press coverage reached beyond New York. The Washing-
ton Post reported on a similar practice in the District of Columbia. Karlyn Barker, Policy Turns the
Abused into Suspects: Mothers Find Seeking Help Can Backfire in the District, WASHINGTON POST,
Dec. 26, 2001, at BI. Legal Press such as the New York Law Journal printed more in-depth articles.
Mark Hamblett, Stayed Injunction May Encourage Negotiations, Judge Pushes Deal on Foster Care
Suit, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 20, 2001, at 1.
2. See, e.g., In re Nicholson, 181 F. Supp. 2d 182 (E.D.N.Y. 2001) (granting preliminary
injunction), supplemented sub nom. Nicholson v. Williams, 203 F. Supp. 2d 153 (E.D.N.Y. 2002)
(finding state policy unconstitutional), certifying questions sub nom. Nicholson v. Scoppetta, 344
F.3d 154 (2d Cir. 2003). Certified question answered by Nicholson v. Scoppetta, 820 N.E.2d 840
(N.Y. 2004), remanded by Nicholson v. Scoppetta, 116 Fed.Appx. 313 (2d Cir. 2004). Stipulation &
Order of Settlement, Nicholson v. Williams, No. 00 CV 2229 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 17, 2004) (on file with
author).
3. Id. at 2.
4. In an article published shortly after the New York Court of Appeals' decision was ren-
dered, this author noted that the decision simplified the issues that would be revisited by the Second
Circuit. She did not foretell the settlement of the case less than two months later. Justine A. Dunlap,
Sometimes I Feel Like a Motherless Child: The Error of Pursuing Battered Mothers for Failure to
Protect, 50 Loy. L. REV. 565, 597-98 (2004).
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order.5 The Nicholson "case" comprises at least three substantial opin-
ions from the federal district and appellate courts as well as the New
York Court of Appeals. That complexity notwithstanding, it can be
fairly summarized as follows: mothers who are battered in front of their
children are not guilty of neglecting them-on the sole ground that the
children have witnessed the violence-under New York's child abuse
and neglect laws.6 At several points within the opinion, the New York
high court explicitly rejected any notion that witnessing domestic vio-
lence is a presumptive ground for neglect or removal.7
This article will first examine the events that led to the filing of
Nicholson. Next, it will look at the Nicholson opinions, most particularly
the one issued by the New York Court of Appeals! The article will con-
clude by assessing the impact of Nicholson, in New York and elsewhere.
I. BEFORE NICHOLSON
Nicholson, of course, locates its beginning long before the lawsuit
was filed.9 In 1995, lawyers from Sanctuary for Families, a multidisci-
plinary organization that assists women survivors of domestic violence,
began noticing a disturbing development. Battered women were being
charged with failing to protect their children if the children were present
during episodes of domestic violence.10
5. The settlement order was entered shortly before the trial of the case on the merits, which
had been scheduled for Dec. 22, 2004. The order did not actually dismiss the case. Rather, the case
was placed on the court's suspense calendar; it will be dismissed with prejudice on Sept. 1, 2005
unless the Plaintiffs restore the case to the court's active calendar. As of June 7, 2005, no action had
been taken to restore the case and the Plaintiffs' attorney did not anticipate such an occurrence
before September 1, 2005. Telephone Interview with Jill M. Zuccardy, Esq., Director, Child Protec-
tion Project, Sanctuary for Families (June 7, 2005).
6. That was essentially the conclusion of the New York Court of Appeals in response to the
first question certified to it by the Second Circuit. Nicholson v. Scoppetta, 820 N.E.2d 840, 843-45
(N.Y. 2004).
7. Id. at 854.
8. See Dunlap, supra note 4, at 593-98 for an earlier discussion of these opinions. See also
Maureen Collins, Nicholson v. Williams: Who is Failing to Protect Whom? Collaborating the Agen-
das of Child Welfare Agencies and Domestic Violence Services to Better Protect and Support Bat-
tered Mothers and Their Children, 38 NEW. ENG. L. REv. 725, 728-37 (2004).
9. Jill M. Zuccardy, Nicholson v. Williams: The Case, 82 DENV. U. L. REV. 655, 655-57
(2005) [hereinafter Zuccardy, Transcript]. For a discussion of the evolution of the lawsuit, see also
Jill M. Zuccardy, Child Protective Cases Involving Domestic Violence Issues, in 189 PRACTICING
LAW INSTITUTE LITIGATION AND ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES
CRIMINAL LAW AND URBAN PROBLEMS 165 (2002).
10. Zuccardy, Transcript, supra note 9; Melissa A. Trepiccione, At the Crossroads of Law
and Social Science: Is Charging a Battered Mother with Failure to Protect Her Child an Acceptable
Solution When Her Child Witnesses Domestic Violence? 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1487, 1487 (2001).
Similar cases also occurred elsewhere. See, e.g., In re A.D.R., 542 N.E.2d 487 (111. App. Ct. 1989).
See generally, V. Pualani Enos, Prosecuting Battered Mothers: State Laws' Failure to Protect
Battered Women andAbused Children, 19 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 229,238 (1996).
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The New York state court case of In re Lonell J. " was the "tipping
point," suggests Jill Zuccardy, Sanctuary's lawyer in Nicholson.12 That
1998 case held that the government need not offer expert testimony to
prove harm alleged to have been caused by witnessing domestic vio-
lence. 13 This, on its face, is a rather unexceptional declaration. Indeed, it
was repeated by the New York Court of Appeals decision in Nicholson
some six years later.' 4 However, soon after it was handed down, Lonell
J. began to be interpreted as adopting a per se standard that witnessing
domestic violence constitutes neglect by the battered mother.'
5
Sanctuary helped many of these women battle against charges filed
by ACS. After resolution of their cases in the family court, individual
battered women filed civil rights lawsuits against the agency. These suits
collectively formed the Nicholson class action.'
6
II. THE NICHOLSON DECISIONS
In January 2002, Judge Weinstein issued a preliminary injunction,
after a lengthy trial held during the previous summer and fall.' 7 The
injunction precluded the agency from seeking removal of children from
battered women on the sole ground that the children had witnessed do-
mestic violence.' 8  Judge Weinstein's extensive memorandum opinion
11. In re Lonell J., Jr., 673 N.Y.S.2d 116 (App. Div. 1998). LonellJ. is sometimes described
as the first case holding battered mothers liable for failure to protect. See, e.g., The "Failure to
Protect" Working Group, Charging Battered Mothers with "Failure to Protect": Still Blaming the
Victim, 27 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 849, 852 (2000). However, the cases of In re Melissa U, 538
N.Y.S.2d 958 (App. Div. 1989), and In re Theresa CC, 576 N.Y.S.2d 937 (App. Div. 1991), reached
similar conclusions several years earlier. See Dunlap, supra note 4, at 607-08, for a full discussion of
these cases. Nonetheless, Lonell I appears to be the case that started the trend of prosecuting bat-
tered mothers in New York.
12. Zuccardy, Transcript, supra note 9, at 655. Others have also suggested that Lonell J. was
a critical case. See The "Failure to Protect" Working Group, supra note l1, at 852. Further, Lonell
J. has been described as adopting a de facto strict liability standard. Id. See infra notes 30-35 and
accompanying text for further discussion of strict liability.
13. In Lonell J., the mother was "charged" with abuse and neglect in a family court proceed-
ing. In re Lonell 1, 673 N.Y.S.2d at 116. There are also instances in which mothers have been
charged criminally with failure to protect.
14. Nicholson v. Scoppetta, 820 N.E.2d 840, 855 (N.Y. 2004).
15. Zuccardy, Transcript, supra note 9, at 656-57. An unrelated event further contributed to
the problem, according to Zuccardy. A child's death led the child protection agency to take a stance
that encouraged the removal of children. Id. at 657. Thus women who were beaten were being
charged with child neglect and their children were being taken from them, often without court order.
These removals exacerbated the wrongs-legal and otherwise-perpetrated against these women
and children; wrongs that the trial court judge termed "pitiless double abuse." Nicholson v. Wil-
liams, 203 F. Supp. 2d 153, 163 (E.D.N.Y. 2002).
16. A named plaintiff, Sharwline Nicholson, was represented by the public interest law firm
of Lansner & Kubitschek. Nicholson filed suit in federal court in April 2000. Her case was later
consolidated with other named plaintiffs. Zuccardy from Sanctuary joined as co-counsel. In August
2001, the classes were certified by Judge Weinstein. Nicholson, 820 N.E.2d at 843. News reports at
the time hinted at a burgeoning class size that could top out at 30,000. Graham Rayman, Conflict
Over Size of Class-Action, NEWSDAY, Mar. 28, 2001, at A 16.
17. In reNicholson, 181 F. Supp. 2d 182, 183 (E.D.N.Y. 2001).
18. Id. at 188-93.
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followed in March.' 9 The opinion was far-reaching in its finding of
wrongs perpetrated by ACS.
In that awkward paradox of pending litigation, the city agreed to fix
its practices even as it averred its innocence.20 In this latter capacity, the
city appealed Weinstein's order. However, the Second Circuit refused to
stay the injunction pending appeal.2 '
The Second Circuit ruled in September 2003 .22 It determined that if
the case could be resolved through the interpretation of state child abuse
and neglect law, it might be unnecessary to reach the federal constitu-
tional issues decided by Judge Weinstein. Therefore, the Second Circuit
certified three questions to the New York Court of Appeals.
The New York Court of Appeals accepted the certification.23  It
heard oral argument in September 2004 and ruled the next month, an-
swering the three questions certified to it by the Second Circuit. Those
questions will be addressed in turn.
A. First Certified Question
The first question certified by the Second Circuit was: "Does the
definition of a 'neglected child' under New York Family Court Act §
1012(f); (h)24 include instances in which the sole allegation of neglect is
that the parent or other person legally responsible for the child's care
allows the child to witness domestic abuse against the caretaker? ' 25 The
New York Court of Appeals simplified the issue: Does state law permit
a finding of neglect predicated upon "two facts only": first, had the
charged parent been abused and, second, had the child "been exposed" to
that abuse?26 In immediate response, the court said that "plainly" more isrequired to prove neglect.
The court then analyzed the two provisions of the statute cited in the
certified question. Section 1012(f) of the statute sets forth the basic defi-
nition of neglect with a two-part causal standard. First, a "child's physi-
cal, mental or emotional condition" must either be impaired or be in
19. Nicholson v. Williams, 203 F. Supp. 2d 153 (E.D.N.Y. 2002).
20. Indeed, the city's defense throughout the trial was that it did not remove children based
solely on exposure to domestic violence. Zuccardy, Transcript, supra note 9, at 663.
21. Zuccardy, Transcript, supra note 9, at 668. Judge Weinstein initially stayed the injunc-
tion. In re Nicholson, 181 F. Supp at 193. The stay was later lifted.
22. Nicholson v. Scoppetta, 344 F.3d 154 (2d Cir. 2003).
23. Id. at 167-68.
24. N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 1012(0 (McKinney 2005) provides the core definition of neglected
child; § 1012(h) defines emotional or mental neglect - the type of neglect at issue in Nicholson.
25. Nicholson, 820 N.E.2d at 844.
26. Id The court did not analyze the potential difference between witnessing the abuse and
being exposed to it. For an analysis of these differences see Dunlap, supra note 4, at 570-72.
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"imminent danger" of becoming impaired.27  If the impairment is estab-
lished, the state must then prove that it is caused by the parent's failure to
"exercise a minimum degree of care." 28  This requirement that parental
failure be the source of the child's harm is significant in two ways.
First, it demonstrates that the legislature did not intend to make
child neglect a strict liability proposition. There must be a nexus be-
tween the harm and the parent's failure to exercise the minimum stan-
dard.29
This clarification is significant. The Lonell J.30 and Glenn G.3
cases, among others, have been described as imposing strict liability in
neglect actions. Indeed, the Glenn G. court stated that the neglect statute
imposes "strict liability. 3 2  This conclusion is clearly contrary to the
plain language of the statute, which requires a failure to meet a minimum
standard of care. 33  The Glenn G. court appears to have conflated liabil-
ity for unintentional actions with strict liability. Certainly neglect can be
found absent a parent's intent to be neglectful. Strict liability, on the
other hand, would apply in circumstances where harm occurred notwith-
standing the exercise of due care.
As a practical matter, however, courts may have been willing to
conclude that the "conduct" of being a victim fell below the minimum
standard of care. In In re Theresa CC, 34 the court cursorily concluded
that there was a causal connection between the children's problems-
e.g., the harm-and the parents' conduct. This conclusion is problem-
atic, however, as the mother's only "conduct" was being the recipient of
abuse.
35
27. Nicholson, 820 N.E.2d at 844-45. The imminent danger standard, the court said, demon-
strates that neglect may be found short of actual harm but that the risk of harm had to be more than
"merely possible." Id. at 845.
28. Id. at 844. The court noted that proof of this nexus is especially important in cases alleg-
ing emotional impairment, due to the "murky" nature of determining the source of such non-physical
impairments. Id. at 845-46.
29. This failure, however, can be attributable to inability as well as unwillingness. Id. at 845-
46. As one court stated, "Good faith, good intentions, and even best efforts" are not enough to
defeat this objective test. In re Katherine C., 471 N.Y.S.2d 216, 218 (Fain. Ct. 1984). This same
court later described the parental obligation to the child's welfare as "fundamental and absolute." Id.
at 220.
30. Working Group, supra note 11, at 852. The Lonell J. court, in addition to finding that
expert testimony was unnecessary to prove harm, stated that parental "spousal abuse" was an act
that, under the statute, fell outside the minimum standard of care. In re Lonell J., 673 N.Y.S.2d 116,
118 (App. Div. 1998).
31. Kristian Miccio, In the Name of Mothers and Children: Deconstructing the Myth of the
Passive Battered Mother and the "Protected Child" in Child Neglect Proceedings, 58 ALB. L. REV.
1087, 1092-96 (1995).
32. In re Glenn G., 587 N.Y.S.2d 464, 470 (Fam. Ct. 1992).
33. N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 1012(f)(i) (McKinney 2005).
34. 576 N.Y.S.2d 937, 938 (App. Div. 1991).
35. This conclusion is reminiscent of language used to charge the Nicholson plaintiffs. They
were, as victims, said to be "engaged" in domestic violence. Nicholson, 203 F. Supp. 2d at 186.
During the Nicholson trial, ACS's division of legal services wrote a memorandum clarifying the
20051
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Second, the New York Court of Appeals' holding in Nicholson
fleshed out this minimum-level-of-care standard. Initially, the court
noted that this is a baseline standard, applying to all parents.36 Further, it
is a standard of minimum care, not ideal parenting. 3 Finally, the court
said that the failure to provide this minimal care must be actual, not
threatened.38
The court then stated that the issue must be evaluated by reference
to an objective person standard: how would a reasonably prudent parent
have acted under the circumstances? 39 The court thus declined to adopt a
reasonable battered mother standard.40  But it did make clear that the
circumstances and the special vulnerabilities of the child are part of the
calculus.41 In conclusion, the court set forth numerous factors that would
be relevant in assessing whether the battered mother behaved reasonably.
Those factors include: risks attendant to leaving as well as staying; risks
attendant to seeking redress and protection via "government channels;"
and risks attendant to both criminal prosecution of the batterer and of
relocation.4 2
The court's articulation of these specific considerations gives mean-
ing to the standard of a reasonable prudent person under the circum-
stances. First, the court explicitly discussed actions that are traditionally
deemed to be the "appropriate" response for battered women. Indeed,
women are often penalized for failing to follow one or more of these
steps. 43  Second, the court acknowledged that such actions carry risks-
to the children as well as to the mothers. Therefore, the court validated
the notion that battered women may be acting reasonably if they choose
not to take certain expected actions.
Of course, it remains to be seen if this principle will be correctly
applied. How can a woman demonstrate that if she chooses not to leave,
phrase "engaging in domestic violence," stating that its "usage misstates the nature of the victim's
role ...." Memorandum from Joseph Cardieri and William Bell, to ACS Department of Legal
Services and Department of Child Protection Staff (Aug. 14, 2001) (on file with author). The
memorandum mandated that the phrase no longer be used. Id. Attorney compliance with the
Nicholson mandates remains "uneven at best." Nicholson Review Committee Report, to Judge Jack
B. Weinstein, United States District Judge, Eastern District of New York, 10 (Dec. 17, 2004) (on file
with author).
36. Nicholson, 820 N.E.2d at 846.
37. Id. This is clearly a constitutional requirement. The state could not coercively interfere
with the liberty interest that adheres to the parent-child relationship based on a parent's failure to
provide perfect parenting.
38. Id.
39. Id. This standard was suggested by early writings on the topic. Professor Miccio urged
such a standard over a decade ago. Miccio, supra note 31, at 1097-98, 1105. Professor Miccio has
since argued for a more stringent reasonable battered mother's test. Kristian Miccio, A Reasonable
Battered Mother? Redefining, Reconstructing, and Recreating the Battered Mother in Child Protec-
tive Proceedings, 22 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 89,94-95 (1999). See also Enos, supra note 10, at 264.
40. Miccio, supra note 39, at 94-95.
41. Nicholson, 820 N.E.2d at 846-47.
42. Id at 846. See also Miccio, supra note 31, at 1098-99.
43. Dunlap, supra note 4, at 573-74; Miccio, supra note 31, at 1092.
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get a protective order, or pursue criminal prosecution, she has, in fact,
reasonably calculated the various options and their attendant risks? For-
tunately, the Court of Appeals' decision may help here as well. The court
credited this dilemma by citing favorably to recent legislative mandates
for social services personnel to receive special training regarding the
44dynamics of domestic violence in order to avoid punitive responses.
Although concluding that an allegation of witnessing alone does not
satisfy the statutory requirements for neglect, the court did not hold that a
neglect case alleging witnessing could never be properly established
against a battered mother. Witnessing, on its own, is insufficient. But
witnessing, coupled with evidence of harm and a parental failure of
minimal care, can constitute neglect.
45
B. Second Certified Question
The New York Court of Appeals then proceeded to the second certi-
fied question: "Can the injury or possible injury, if any, that results to a
child who has witnessed domestic abuse against a parent or other care-
taker constitute 'danger' or 'risk' to the child's 'life or health,' as those
terms are defined in the New York Family Court Act §§ 1022, 1024,
1026-28?
'46
This certified question is important because improper removal of
the children from their battered mothers was alleged throughout Nichol-
son. Indeed, the trial court found these removals to be a pervasive and
unconstitutional practice.47
Removals are statutorily authorized to occur in four different cir-
cumstances. The court phrased the overarching issue presented for re-
view as follows: "[W]hether emotional harm suffered by a child exposed
to domestic violence, where shown, can warrant the trauma of removal
under any of these provisions. '48 Consistent with this explicit statement
that removal causes trauma, the court stated, "removal may do more
harm to the child than good. ' 49
Courts have determined that removal itself is harmful and justified
only after a balancing of the harms that will occur absent removal-as
have legislatures, through statutes and legislative history, and agencies,
through written policies. Yet removal - often on an ex parte emergency
44. Nicholson, 820 N.E.2d at 847 n.6.
45. Id. at 846-47.
46. Id. at 847.
47. Nicholson v. Williams, 203 F. Supp. 2d 153, 215 (E.D.N.Y. 2002).
48. Nicholson, 820 N.E.2d at 849 (emphasis added).
49. Id The court further stated that removals should not be treated as the "safer course" to be
used "to mask a dearth of evidence or as a watered-down, impermissible presumption." Id. at 853.
2005]
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basis - is the rule in practice.50 The perennial battle between what is right
and what actually happens-the law on the books versus the law as it
looks-is often fought in child protection proceedings.5' Moreover,
these hasty and ill-considered removals are not wrongs that are easily
rectified. Removals often set the course for the case, in both the case-
work and legal focus.5 2 As a practical matter, the burden transfers to the
parents, who now must prove that they deserve the child back.53 More
importantly, as explicitly found by Judge Weinstein, removals harm
children.5 4 Removals are not a neutral, let's-play-it-safe option.
After acknowledging the trauma caused by removal, the New York
Court of Appeals analyzed each type of removal. 55 It did so with refer-
ence to the Second Circuit's speculation that, depending upon how the
state court interpreted the neglect statute, the removals were likely to be
constitutionally infirm in any number of ways.56 Further, the court noted
that its analysis included balancing potentially conflicting child welfare
policies such as keeping families together versus the need to protect chil-
dren in cases of domestic violence.
57
The court stated that since exposure to domestic violence is not pre-
sumptively neglectful, then exposure cannot be a presumptive ground for
removal. 5V Moreover, identifying a risk of serious harm is not enough.59
Instead, a court must balance the risk of staying against the risk of re-
moval.60 In addition, it must assess whether any risk that might flow
from non-removal can be otherwise ameliorated.61 To illustrate this lat-
ter point, the Court of Appeals cited with approval the possibility of re-
moving the batterer rather than the child.62
50. Nicholson, 203 F. Supp. 2d at 237. See Paul Chill, Burden of Proof Begone: The Perni
cious Effect of Emergency Removal in Child Protective Proceedings, 42 FAM. CT. REV. 540, 541
(2004).
51. The New York Court of Appeals acknowledged that extant practice might be contrary to
statute. Nicholson, 820 N.E.2d at 853.
52. Chill, supra note 50, at 542.
53. Id. at 542-45. Battered mothers are immediately suspect for their perceived lack of par-
enting skills or even maternal instinct. Thus, this burden may prove to be insurmountable.
ELIZABETH M. SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN AND FEMINIST LAWMAKING 157-68 (2000); Enos,
supra note 10, at 267.
54. Nicholson, 203 F. Supp. 2d at 251; Evan Stark, The Battered Mother in the Child Protec-
tive Service Caseload: Developing an Appropriate Response, 23 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 107, 118-19
(2002). Advocates of removal often appear to be unaware of or simply unwilling to acknowledge
the well-documented cost of removal. See, e.g., Melanie Margarida Nowling, Protecting Children
Who Witness Domestic Violence: Is Nicholson v. Williams an Adequate Response?, 41 FAM. &
CONCILIATION CTS. REv. 517, 520 (2003).
55. Nicholson, 820 N.E.2d at 849-54.
56. Id. at 847-48.
57. Id. at 84849.
58. Id. at 849.
59. Id. at 851-52.
60. Id. at 852.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 851-52.
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Two of the four possible avenues for removal create the greatest
concern. Both of these are removals that can occur before the filing of a
petition. The ex parte removal is pursuant to a pre-petition court order.6 3
The other-an emergency removal-occurs via the agency's unilateral
determination of risk of harm; a neglect petition and court review of the
removal follow.64 Describing the circumstances under which an emer-
gency removal would be legitimate as "urgent" and "very grave," 65 the
court gave a very cautious assessment of when such removals would be
appropriate.66 The court was unwilling to say never, but nonetheless
stated that it would be a "rare circumstance" in which emotional injury,
or the risk thereof, would be sufficient to justify these emergency remov-
als.
67
C. Third Certified Question
The third question certified by the Second Circuit to the New York
Court of Appeals was: "Does the fact that the child witnessed such abuse
suffice to demonstrate that 'removal is necessary,' or that 'removal was
in the child's best interests,' or must the child protective agency offer
additional, particularized evidence to justify removal? ' 68 Reiterating its
prior conclusion that witnessing domestic violence does not trigger a
presumption of removal, the court quickly determined that particularized
evidence is needed. 69 However, it rejected the idea that such particular-
ized evidence must include expert testimony.70
The reference to expert testimony carries Nicholson full circle back
to Lonell J.7 In Lonell J, the trial court had refused to make a finding of
neglect in the absence of expert testimony showing emotional harm as a
consequence of witnessing domestic violence. 72 The appellate court,
however, determined that such expert testimony was not required. The
Court of Appeals, in Nicholson, declined to read Lonell J. as holding that
witnessing was presumptively neglect. In so stating, it noted that the case
had involved more than an assertion of witnessing; there were, the court
said, "multiple factors" supporting a neglect finding.73 Thus, although
Lonell J. has been blamed74 for starting the rush towards holding battered
women liable for failure to protect,75 the New York Court of Appeals'
63. Id. at 852.
64. Id. at 853-54.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 853-54.
67. Id. at 854.
68. Id. at 854 (internal citations omitted).
69. Id. at 382-83.
70. Id. at 855.
71. LonelIlJ, 673 N.Y.S.2d at 116.
72. Id. at 117.
73. Nicholson, 820 N.E.2d at 855,
74. Or credited, depending on one's point of view.
75. See Zuccardy, Transcript, supra note 9, at 656-57.
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conclusions support the notion that it was, in fact, misread and misap-
plied.
III. JUDGING NICHOLSON
In the final analysis, Nicholson offers a little something for every-
one. It clearly provides that women who are beaten in front of their chil-
dren are neither presumptively guilty of neglect nor presumptively sub-
ject to having their children removed. To some, however, that is a pat-
ently obvious reading of the statute. With its two-part, casually con-
nected definition of neglect, its valid interpretation could not be other-
wise. And, if it were, then federal constitutional provisions would re-
quire either that the statute be interpreted consistent with constitutional
mandates or that it be struck down.76
Of course, this "obvious" conclusion eluded trial and appellate
courts, as well as New York City's child welfare agency, for nearly a
decade. So this clear enunciation of the statute by the Court of Appeals
is welcomed relief to countless mothers and children who will, one
hopes, no longer be subjected to agency "pique
7 7 or "pitiless double
abuse." 78 Further, the court's unequivocal assertion that the state must
prove harm to children that is the result of a parent's failure to exercise a
minimum degree of care may lessen the divide between the law as it
reads and as it is applied. Nicholson was a lengthy and publicized case
that cannot be overlooked; perhaps judges, lawyers, and child welfare
professionals will now hew more closely to the law.
But the Plaintiffs' victory is not without limits. First and foremost,
Nicholson makes clear that battered women whose children suffer emo-
tional harm as a result of witnessing domestic abuse may still be neglect-
ful parents. 79 It is now plain that the state must prove that such harm is
the result of the mother failing to meet a minimum standard of care. It is
equally plain, however, that such evidence is readily adducible. Indeed,
Nicholson cites rather commonplace examples as to when a battered
woman might be held culpable for letting her child 
witness her battery.
80
For instance, the court said there might be neglect if: a) the mother knew
that her children were aware of the domestic violence; b) the children
were afraid of the batterer; c) the mother allowed the batterer to return;
76. Nicholson, 820 N.E.2d at 847.
77. Nicholson, 203 F. Supp. 2d at 216.
78. Id. at 163. Judge Weinstein found that children were not returned home simply based
upon the power of the agency to refuse to do so. Id. at 216. He also termed the ordeal of the bat-
tered mothers to be pitiless double abuse. Id. at 163.
79. Imminent risk of such harm would also satisfy the statutory requirement.
80. Nicholson, 820 N.E.2d at 846-47.
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and d) the mother lacked awareness of the impact of the violence on the
children.
81
Thus, Nicholson makes it harder for the government to prove its
case. Or, more bluntly, Nicholson holds that the government can no
longer rely on baseless presumptions in lieu of offering evidence of
harm.82 But Nicholson most assuredly does not take away the cause of
action. Thus, those critical of ACS's policy of alleging neglect based
upon exposure may yet be critical of this result.83
The flaws inherent in the policy-and found by Judge Weinstein-
are arguably still present. Battered women can still be held accountable
for the wrongs of their batterers. Based on their status as abused women,
they-and their children-are being subjected to the child welfare sys-
tem, which itself may cause harm.84 Further, they are not receiving the
support they need from institutional actors in order to extricate them-
selves-and their children-from a violent setting.85
IV. NICHOLSON'S PRECEDENTIAL AND PERSUASIVE IMPACT
It is difficult to accurately gauge Nicholson's impact. First, the final
outcome is still fresh. 86 Second, there is more than one Nicholson opin-
ion. Although the state Court of Appeals opinion is binding state law, it
may also be fairly argued that, in light of the way the case was resolved,
there is no single definitive opinion.87 Each of the three primary deci-
81. Id. (citing In re James MM, 740 N.Y.S.2d 730 (App. Div. 2002)). The court favorably
cited cases in which exposure had been shown to meet the requirements of the neglect statute. Id.
82. Nicholson, 820 N.E.2d at 852-53.
83. This author has suggested that women never be charged with neglect on the sole ground
that their children have witnessed domestic violence. Dunlap, supra note 4, passim; See also
Collins, supra note 8, at 727-54. At least one state, Montana, appears to have done that. Dunlap,
supra note 4, at 605-06.
84. Richard Wexler, Take The Child and Run: Tales From the Age ofASFA, 36 NEW ENG. L.
REv. 129, 136-37 (2001).
85. Illustrating this point is the fact that the social worker in LonellJ. ceased working with the
family because the father-the abuser--objected to her involvement. So it was legitimate for the
professional to be scared off by the father but not for the mother to be so intimidated. In re Lonell J.,
Jr., 673 N.Y.S.2d 116 (App. Div. 1998). In many ways, Lonell J. is a textbook circumstance of
domestic violence and all that it can represent. First, and at the risk of essentializing, the mother was
a classic victim. She told the social worker that she deserved to be hit and, once the violence came
to light, she minimized it. Second, the chaos of a family living in domestic violence was exacer-
bated as this family also lived a shelter. Finally, the shelter raises several points to consider. How
was the violence occurring in such a public setting? That query, coupled with the fact that the social
worker stopped her work with the family due to the father's objection, demonstrates graphically the
sway exerted by batterers. Yet only the mothers are held accountable. See also Leigh Goodmark,
Law Is the Answer? Do We Know That for Sure?: Questioning the Efficacy of Legal Interventions
for Battered Women, 23 ST. Louis U. PuB. L. REv. 7 (2004).
86. Indeed, the outcome will not be absolutely final until the case is removed from the sus-
pense docket on Sept. 1, 2005. See supra note 5.
87. The Nicholson lawsuit itself has settled and is on the verge of dismissal; none of the
judicial opinions that flow from this suit were reversed and thus are, at least, persuasive authority.
The New York Court of Appeals opinion is, of course, binding law in the jurisdiction.
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sions has value in its own way. As one might expect, each has been
cited in support of different propositions.s9
The Nicholson opinions have been cited most frequently, of course,
by New York courts. The New York Court of Appeals decision has been
cited several times for its clear articulation of what the government must
prove in a neglect case. In that capacity, it has been used by New York's
intermediate-tier appellate courts to reverse lower court neglect findings
against battered mothers. For instance, in In re: Eryck N., two years after
the Nicholson trial, a mother was charged with exposing her five children
to domestic violence. They were removed from her care.
90 The appeals
court reversed, citing the "landmark decision" of Nicholson in the New
York Court of Appeals.9' The court found that the "dearth" of evidence
adduced concerning the effect of the domestic violence on the children
did not meet the standard set forth in Nicholson.
92
Nicholson has also been cited in cases in which the lower appellate
courts have found the newly articulated burden to have been met. How-
ever, none of these cases yet involve the traditional failure-to-protect
scenario of Nicholson.93 But some come close. In In re Taisha R.,
94 the
harm requirement was deemed to be met based on the "fear and distress"
that one of the children experienced after the mother told the child not to
tell anyone about the domestic violence. 95 This one-page appellate opin-
ion raises several points of concern. First, there was another ground on
88. Those decisions are defined here as Judge Weinstein's memorandum opinion in support of
the preliminary injunction, the Second Circuit's opinion, and the New York Court of Appeals'
decision. There were, of course, other orders throughout the case. Judge Weinstein's Jan. 2001
order issuing the preliminary injunction, while the engine that ran the case, has not been cited as
frequently as his memorandum in support of that injunction.
89. Often the various opinions are cited for reasons not particularly relevant for this analysis.
For instance, Judge Weinstein's opinion has been cited for principles related to ineffective assistance
of counsel. People v. Toms, 743 N.Y.S.2d 690, 699 (N.Y. Co. Ct. 2002). The Nicholson Second
Circuit opinion has been cited, e.g., for principles related to injunctive relief. Stauber v. City of New
York, No. 03 Civ. 9162(RWS), 2004 WL 1593870, at *22 (S.D.N.Y. July 16,2004).
90. In re Eryck N., 791 N.Y.S.2d 857, 857 (App. Div. 2005). The mother had initially gone
with her children to a shelter and had secured a protection order. Id. However, she left the shelter in
order to "facilitate visitation between her husband and the children due to a modification of the order
of protection." Id.
91. Id. at 858.
92. Id. See also In re Ravern H., 789 N.Y.S.2d 563 (App. Div. 2005). Relying on Nicholson,
the Ravern court reversed a neglect finding because the government had merely proven that the
mother was a victim of domestic violence and the children had been exposed to it. Id. at 565.
93. See, e.g., In re Richard T., 785 N.Y.S.2d 169, 170 (App. Div. 2004), wherein the mother's
instigation of an altercation with her own mother in the presence of the children was found to meet
the standard set forth in Nicholson. But cf. In re Daniel GG, 792 N.Y.S.2d 710, 711-12 (App. Div.
2005), in which the court reversed a neglect finding based on a single incident of shoving where
harm to the child was not demonstrated. In In re Paul U., 785 N.Y.S.2d 767, 769 (App. Div. 2004),
the court determined that a neglect finding based upon a mother's attempt to place her son perma-
nently with the father who was subject to a stay-away order from both mother and child was consis-
tent with the just-announced Nicholson standard. The child, although not yet harmed, was in immi-
nent danger of impairment and the mother's actions, in light of her knowledge of the father's past
violence, were not within the necessary minimum degree of care. Id.
94. 788 N.Y.S.2d 357 (App. Div. 2005).
95. Id. at 358.
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which to establish neglect, so it can be argued that the court unnecessar-
ily found harm on the domestic violence allegation. 96  Further, this
mother may have reasonably believed that her actions-telling the child
not to tell anyone about the abuse-were protective.97 Thus, even if the
harm prong was proven, perhaps the failure to meet a minimum standard
of care was not.
98
Neglect was found in each of the preceding cases at the trial level,
even if subsequently reversed by an appellate court. And each of these
cases was initiated in 2003, over a year after the Nicholson injunction
was issued. But none of the trial level courts appear to have been influ-
enced by the case.
What can explain the initial reticence to follow Nicholson?99 There
is little doubt that these judges were aware of the Nicholson case, as it
received significant publicity.'00 One explanation is that natural, indeed
constitutional, tension between state and federal courts. This tension
may approach animosity when state courts perceive that the federal
courts are intruding upon state court jurisdiction.'' The Second Circuit
mentioned this as grounds for its decision to certify the three questions of
state law to the New York Court of Appeals. 102 Further, Nicholson law-
yers have suggested that, in general, courts were unhappy with the litiga-
tion. °3  It is also possible that, on a substantive level, the courts dis-
agreed with Judge Weinstein's decision, which was not binding on thestate courts.1 4 Therefore, they simply chose not to follow it.
96. The second ground was marijuana usage. Id.
97- Id. This case also flags the domestic-violence sensitive lawyering that will be required
under Nicholson. In order to demonstrate that certain actions are protective and reasonable, lawyers
representing these mothers will themselves need to be aware of the issues in a way that permits them
to bring relevant evidence before the court. See Sarah M. Buel, Effective Assistance of Counsel for
Battered Women Defendants: A Normative Construct, 26 HARV. WOMEN'S L. J. 217,305 (2003).
98. The Nicholson Court of Appeals decision listed factors that a court must weigh in assess-
ing whether the minimum standard of care has been met. Nicholson, 820 N.E.2d at 846. One can
easily imagine that a parent who has been threatened with further harm should she reveal the abuse
might reasonably caution her child against such disclosure.
99. Of course, no court has articulated this reticence. And in what are typically very brief
appellate opinions, rationale is often unstated and hard to discern. But in each of the referenced
cases, battered women were prosecuted for exposure notwithstanding the Nicholson case.
100. Supra note 1.
101. See, e.g, Nora Meltzer, Dismissing the Foster Children: The Eleventh Circuit's Misappli-
cation and Improper Expansion of the Younger Abstention Doctrine in Bonnie L. v. Bush, 70
BROOK. L. REv. 635, 636 (2005).
102. Nicholson v. Scoppetta, 344 F.3d 154, 176 (2d Cir. 2002).
103. Zuccardy, Transcript, supra note 9, at 670. The author's own practice experience in
Washington, D.C. corroborates this tension. The District of Columbia child welfare system was
placed under receivership by a federal court. LaShawn A. v. Dixon, 762 F. Supp. 959, 988-89
(D.D.C. 1991). Following that action, there was general confusion over the jurisdictional boundaries
between the federal court, the receiver, and "state" court judges hearing individual neglect cases.
Zuccardy also discusses the state-federal court tension. Zuccardy, Transcript, supra note 9, at 669.
104. The injunction was issued against ACS. In re Nicholson, 181 F. Supp. 2d 182, 183
(E.D.N.Y. 2002).
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Whether one agrees with it or not, the trial court's opinion is com-
pelling reading. Onc easily can come away appalled by the practices and
policies that the court found proved by the evidence.
10 5 However, the
decision, even with its extensive findings and conclusions, has been cited
relatively infrequently. Paradoxically, it has been cited for the proposi-
tion that witnessing domestic violence can cause harm.
10 6  While the
Nicholson opinion does say that,'0 7 its legally salient point is that wit-
nessing is not presumptively harmful. 
10 8
In addition, the Nicholson trial court opinion addressed more than
the three issues certified to the New York Court of Appeals. For in-
stance, Judge Weinstein found that the system of court-appointed counsel
for the "abused mothers is largely a sham."'
1 9  Much of the problem,
Weinstein opined, was the result of the inadequate system of compensa-
tion for court-appointed counsel."10 The Second Circuit, however, de-
ferred resolution of this issue, pending a decision by the New York Court
of Appeals."' That issue has been resolved subsequently by increased
compensation to court-appointed counsel." 
12
The trial court also discussed the impact of a report of neglect upon
a battered women's employability. The issue, in short, is the lingering
consequences of a substantiated report of neglect. In New York, the
State Central Register for Child Abuse and Maltreatment receives,
screens, and investigates reports of child abuse."
3 If a report is "indi-
cated,"'"14 all information concerning the allegation and its investigation
is maintained in the register until the youngest child in the subject family
turns twenty-eight."15 Persons on that register as subjects of "indicated"
105. Zuccardy describes testimony that caused everyone in the courtroom, including the judge,
to be teary-eyed. Zuccardy, Transcript, supra note 9, at 667.
106. MeEvoy v. Brewer, No. M2001-02054-COA-R3-CV, 2003 WL 22794521, at *4 n.4
(Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 25, 2003).
107. As summarized by Judge Weinstein, the experts agreed that exposure to domestic vio-
lence could result in harm (emphasis added). Nicholson v. Williams, 203 F. Supp- 2d 153, 197
(E.D.N.Y. 2002).
108. Id.
109. Id. at 253. Judge Weinstein has written about this issue. Jack B. Weinstein, Hamlet in 
the
District Court: Facing Personal Ethical Dilemmas, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1173, 1175 (2004). 
His
findings on the issue of lawyer compensation have been cited several times. See, e.g., Kenny A. 
v.
Perdue, 356 F. Supp. 2d 1353, 1362 (N.D. Ga. 2005). See also Buel, supra note 97, at 290.
110. Nicholson, 203 F. Supp. 2d at 257.
111. Nicholson v. Scoppetta, 344 F.3d 154, 158 (2d Cir. 2003).
112. Zuccardy, Transcript, supra note 9, at 669; N.Y. COUNTY LAW § 722-b (McKinney
2005).
113. Nicholson, 203 F. Supp. 2d at 166. The investigation function is generally delegated to
local agencies. Id.
114. An "indicated" report is one that the agency, after investigation, determines is supported
by credible evidence. Nicholson, 203 F. Supp. 2d at 166-67; N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 412(12)
(McKinney 2005).
115. Nicholson, 203 F. Supp. 2d at 166-67; N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 422(6) (McKinney 2005).
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reports are generally prevented from obtaining jobs in which they will be
working with children.
116
For battered women, the resultant damage is obvious and cruel.
They are beaten up in the presence of their children. They are charged
with neglect. Their children are removed from their care and custody.
Their name is placed on the register. They are debarred from occupa-
tions involving children, e.g., as childcare workers, teachers, or teacher's
aides. They thereafter lose or are prevented from procuring employment.
Thus, they are deprived of the economic resources required to leave the
batterer. And the cycle starts over.
Of course, Nicholson has had an impact beyond what can be
gleaned from case citations. Most obviously, ACS has reformed its prac-
tices.117 Attorney compensation has been increased." 8 Further, the state
legislature has enacted a law requiring all child protection caseworkers to
be trained in the principles set forth in Nicholson. 119
Of what import is Nicholson beyond the state boundaries of New
York? Its ultimate resolution on state law rather than federal constitu-
tional grounds is likely to limit its national reach. Child abuse and ne-
glect law flows from both state law and federal constitutional law. But
the legal provisions for holding mothers liable for witnessing are primar-
ily state-law based. 12  Since the case was settled on the strength of the
New York Court of Appeals' interpretation of state neglect law, its legal
relevance for other state's statutory and decisional law is persuasive at
best.
There are often similarities, however, among state neglect laws.
Therefore, to the extent a state has laws identical or even similar to
Nicholson, its impact may extend beyond the boundaries of New York.
By way of example, New Jersey's definition of neglect is remarkably
similar to New York's. It has the same, causally connected, two ele-
ments: 1) harm--or its imminent risk; that 2) results from the parent's
failure to exercise minimum care. 121 Accordingly, a New Jersey court
116. There are ways around this barrier, but they involve the submission by the employer of
written rationale for hiring a person who is the subject of an indicated report. Nicholson, 203 F.
Supp. 2d at 166-67. One can easily imagine that employers may not choose to do this extra work,
especially if there are other potential employees.
117. Nicholson Review committee Report, supra note 35, at passim. The Nicholson Review
Comrmttee ("NRC") was established as part of the preliminary injunction. In re Nicholson, 181 F.
Supp. 2d at 192-93. It met monthly to assess compliance with the injunction. The NRC reports to
Judge Weinstein indicate that the reform of ACS practices was not always quickly or smoothly
accomplished. Nicholson Review Committee Report, supra note 35, atpassim.
118. See Zuccardy, Transcript, supra note 9, at 668-69.
119. Zuccardy, Transcript, supra note 9, at 669-70.
120. See, e.g., Dunlap supra note 4, at 599-607. See Mundorffinfra note 128, at 148-55 for a
description of some of the training for ACS workers prior to Nicholson.
121. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:6-8.21 (c)(4) (West 2005).
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could find New York's highest court's interpretation of an identical stat-
ute to be compelling.
Indeed, a New Jersey appellate court, in New Jersey Division of
Youth and Family Services v. S.S.,122 cited to Judge Weinstein's findings
when it held that witnessing domestic violence does not necessarily harm
children. 123 In reversing a neglect finding against a battered mother, the
court wrote that the agency officials and the court below improperly as-
sumed that witnessing domestic violence harmed children.
124  It thus
reached the same conclusion that the New York Court of Appeals in
Nicholson later reached: a battered mother may be held liable for neglect
for permitting her child to be exposed to domestic violence if and only if
the state proves harm that was the result of her failure to exercise a
minimum degree of care.125
The several Nicholson opinions have been cited in numerous law
review articles, both favorably
126 and otherwise. 127  Two articles have
recently examined the slavery and involuntary servitude parallels flowing
from Judge Weinstein's conclusion that there were possible violations of
the Thirteenth and Nineteenth Amendments.
28  Likewise, legal com-
mentary has cited Nicholson.
129
122. 855 A.2d 8 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2004).
123. New Jersey Div. of Youth & Family Servs., 855 A.2d at 15-16.
124. Id. at 16. In S.S., the mother was attacked by her husband while their 21-month old boy
was in her arms. Id. at 10. The child was removed on an emergency basis without a court order. Id.
at 11-12. The mother was not allowed to be with the child unsupervised. Id. at 11. In its reversal,
the appellate court noted that there was no evidence that the child was harmed. Id. at 14. According
to the caseworker, he was "a cute little guy who was friendly, happy and healthy." Id. at 12. Other
testimony "confirmed" that the mother was a good parent. Id. Nor was any other testimony pre-
sented regarding the impact of witnessing domestic violence. Id. at 13-14.
125. Id. at 15. The S.S. court made clear, as did the Nicholson court, that the harm may be
unintentional, i.e., a parent who acts in reckless disregard of known risks to the child. Id.
126. See, e.g., Heidi A. White, Refusing To Blame The Victim For The Aftermath of Domestic
Violence: Nicholson v. Williams Is A Step In The Right Direction, 41 FAM. CT. REV. 527, 531
(2003); Buel, supra note 97, at 288-95; Collins, supra note 8, at 726-37; Trepiccione, supra note 10,
at 1522. Trepiccione's article was written while Nicholson was pending and predates even the trial
decision; however, she predicted it well. She criticized the rush to assume that witnessing causes
harm. Id. at 1501-06.
127. See, e.g., Nowling, supra note 54, at 523-24. In her negative assessment of Nicholson,
Nowling makes a series of challengeable assertions. Further, she urges courts not to be hasty in
deciding the "health and welfare" of children. Id. at 520. Of all the possible critiques of Nicholson,
that it was decided hastily seems ill-founded.
128. Nicholson v. Williams, 203 F. Supp. 2d 153, 247-48 (E.D.N.Y. 2002); Kurt Mundorff,
Children as Chattel: Invoking the Thirteenth Amendment to Reform Child Welfare, I CARDOZO
PUB. L. POL'Y & ETHICS J. 131, 136-47 (2003). Mundorff writes chillingly of his experiences as a
Child Protective Specialist for ACS. His conclusions about race and racism, improper removals,
monetary incentives, and the harms caused by foster care are sobering, to say the least. Id. at 148-
63. Moreover, they speak volumes about the folly of removing children unnecessarily. "When in
doubt, take 'em out" was one trainer's refrain. Id. at 152. See also Shima Baradaran-Robison,
Tipping the Balance in Favor of Justice: Due Process and the Thirteenth and Nineteenth Amend-
ments in Child Removal from Battered Women, 2003 B.Y.U. L. REV. 227,239-63 (2003).
129. See, e.g., Janice Inman, Supreme Court Limits Removing Children From Homes Due to
Partner Abuse, N.Y. FAM. L. MONTHLY, Dec. 6, 2004, at 3; 3 AM. JuR. 2D Proof of Facts § 17.3
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It is somewhat surprising that the Nicholson opinions have not been
more widely cited. 30  The implications are open to interpretation. For
instance, does the low number of citations simply indicate that interested
persons were waiting for the litigation to play out? If so, then it is fair to
expect Nicholson to be cited more now that the case has concluded. Or,
is it that the number of different Nicholson opinions makes reference to it
more difficult? The exact holding of Nicholson is, in some ways, diffi-
cult to pinpoint. Finally, perhaps the lack of extensive citation reveals a
disagreement with the decision itself.
CONCLUSION: LOOKING AHEAD
Will the conclusions of Nicholson ultimately take hold, both among
the relevant professional cohort and in the world of public opinion? Will
those groups endorse the notion that witnessing domestic violence, stand-
ing alone, is insufficient to sustain neglect charges against battered
mothers?
Even those who think Nicholson was rightly decided must acknowl-
edge the challenge of this proposition. For years, advocates against do-
mestic violence have urged that courts consider the impact that exposure
to domestic violence has upon children.13' Finally, legislatures, courts,
researchers, and relevant agencies started to take notice. The assertion
that children are harmed by exposure then became engraved as sacred
truth. So to now urge that the impact of exposure has been oversold may
strike many as either self-serving or contrary to the evidence.
The evidence, however, does indeed show that the assumptions
about the universality of harm were not well-founded. The experts in
Nicholson agreed that harm was possible, not inevitable.1 32 There is, of
course, a range of "possibles" and some experts may find harm more
likely than others.1 33 The problem now lies with how to present the evi-
dence that witnessing is not necessarily harmful.
It is here that critical thinking about the purpose, effects, and legal
bases for the child abuse and neglect system is so important. Such criti-
cal analysis leads one to reject the sloppy logic that transforms the obvi-
ous assertion that it would be better if children did not witness domestic
violence into the conclusion that witnessing always harms children and
(2005); RONALD B. ADRINE & ALEXANDRIA M. RUDEN, BALDWIN'S OHIO HANDBOOK SERIES §§
8:6, 14:24 (2004).
130. Whether a case has been widely cited is, to some degree, a matter of opinion.
131. See Dunlap supra note 4, at 583-84.
132. The evidence proffered at the Nicholson trial is a valid starting point. Competing experts
testified and Judge Weinstein made conclusions about areas of agreement. Nicholson v. Williams,
203 F. Supp. 2d 153, 197-99 (E.D.N.Y. 2002).
133. Evan Stark, an expert for the Plaintiffs, suggests that in 60-75% of families in which
domestic violence is occurring, there are no mental health effects for the children. Stark, supra note
54, at 116-17.
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that battered women should be held liable if their children witness the
violence.
Jill Zuccardy, one of the Nicholson lawyers, is sanguine about the
long-term impact of Nicholson. 13 Calling it a "unique case for systemic
reform," she believes Nicholson provides the basis for changing societal
biases on domestic violence and mothering. 13  Her optimism may be
well-founded.1 36  She has spoken widely about the case in this country
and she, along with her Nicholson co-counsel, have traveled to Australia
to speak to local government officials in the hope of preventing whole-
sale wrongful removals similar those that helped precipitate the Nichol-
son litigation. 37
Those who are persuaded by the findings of the Nicholson trial
court can only hope that Zuccardy is right. There can be two opposite
reactions to the facts highlighted in Nicholson. First, the horrified, disbe-
lieving one. This reaction reveals disbelief and outrage that women are
being blamed. 138  The second reaction offers the requisite sympathy to
the battered adult, but firmly asserts that the children's interest must pre-
vail. 139  Perhaps both reactions need tempering. The first absolves the
mother of responsibility for protection that is inherent in 
parenting. 140
The second is ostrich-like in its assertion that removal benefits children.
Sweeping conclusions about Nicholson are yet premature. While in
their midst, cultural and legal change mimic a glacial pace. Fortunately,
hindsight can offer some perspective. As Professor Miccio pointed out a
decade ago, women were being charged with failing to protect their chil-
dren from witnessing acts that, a few short years earlier, were "socially
permissible."'14 1 Within a relatively short period, wife abuse moved from
134. Zuccardy, Transcript, supra note 9, at 665-70. Zuccardy's optimism is shared by others.
Inman, supra note 129, at 3; Buel supra note 97, at 291-92.
135. Zuccardy, Transcript, supra note 9, at 665-70. See also ELIZABETH SCHNEIDER,
BATTERED WOMEN AND FEMINIST LAWMAKING 148-78 (2000).
136. It is most important, of course, that Nicholson be successful within New York and, espe-
cially, New York City. Class actions and other reform litigation have had a mixed history of success
- if success is defined by systems change, not just a technical legal "win." Professor Elizabeth
Cooper, who teaches a class at Fordham University Law School entitled Institutional Reform
Through the Courts, suggests that the Nicholson class action may have a greater chance of success
since it focused on changing a narrow, discrete wrong. Conversation with Elizabeth Cooper, Asso-
ciate Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law (June 18, 2005).
137, E-mail from Jill Zuccardy, Director, Child Projection Project, Sanctuary for Families, to
Justine Dunlap, Associate Professor of Law, Southern New England School of Law, May 31, 2005
(on file with author).
138. Buel, supra note 97, at 224.
139 In re Jane Doe, 57 P.3d 447, 464 (Haw. 2002). See also Brooke Kintner, The "Other"
Victim: Can We Hold Parents Liable for Failing to Protect Their Children from Harms of Domestic
Violence?, 31 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 271,282-95 (2005).
140. Although it is axiomatic that protecting children is inherent in parenting, the author does
not mean to suggest that the inherent protective nature of parenting legitimizes charging battered
women with failing to protect their children from witnessing domestic abuse. It is important not to
wrongly extend appropriate responsibility into strict liability.
141. Miccio, supra note 31, at 1090.
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being legal to being subject to criminal and civil laws. To then move
rather quickly to charging battered women with failing to protect their
child from witnessing that abuse seemed regressive. Progress, however,
comes in fits and starts. Nicholson is surely a step forward. Perhaps it
will lead, as Zuccardy suggests, to a positive change in social attitudes to
towards battered women and their mothering capabilities. 
42
142. The Nicholson Review Committee Report offers some cause for concern here. It con-
cludes that ACS "remains equivocal" about acknowledging or accepting responsibility for the consti-
tutional violations found by the district court. Nicholson Review Committee Report, supra note 35,
at 10.
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